The Pacific War by Robert O'Neill

Author:Robert O'Neill
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781472813572
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
Published: 2015-04-15T00:00:00+00:00

ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN

By 1944 the glorious Japanese victories across the Far East during 1941 and 1942 and the subsequent humiliation of the Allies were now just dim memories. In the Central Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur’s forces had, since August 1942, worked their way from Guadalcanal up through the Solomons chain of New Georgia, Bougainville, New Britain, and across New Guinea. General MacArthur was now ready to fulfill his promise of “I shall return,” made to the Philippine people when he was ordered to leave by President Roosevelt in the dark days of 1942. It was believed that Peleliu should be seized, as it would provide a vital landing strip and protect MacArthur’s right flank as he launched his attack on the Philippines. As early as May 1944, Nimitz had already issued a warning order for the invasion of the Palau Islands group under the codename of Operation Stalemate. The target date was now set for September 8, 1944.

Initial plans were for MacArthur to push north from New Guinea to Morotai and then on to the Philippines. On the same day that MacArthur’s troops landed on Morotai Island, between the Philippines and New Guinea, the 1st Marine Division, supported by the 81st Infantry Division, were to make landings in the southern Palaus on the islands of Peleliu and Angaur as part of Operation Stalemate II, the revised plan for assaulting the Palau Islands. Due to delays with the earlier Marianas campaign, the revised target date for Operation Stalemate II was set to September 15, 1944.

Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey, as Commander of Western Pacific Task Force, was in overall charge of the supporting operations and, whilst the invasion force was plowing toward the Palaus, he carried out air strikes with carrier-based planes on the Philippines and Palaus. But these raids, despite doing significant damage, were only lightly contested. This suggested to Halsey that they were not as heavily defended as everyone believed. Halsey sent an urgent message to Nimitz on September 13, just two days before the planned assaults on Morotai and the Palaus, recommending:

1.That plans for the seizure of Morotai and the Palaus be abandoned.

2.That the ground forces earmarked for these purposes be diverted to MacArthur for his use in the Philippines.

3.That the invasion of Leyte be undertaken at the earliest possible date.

Nimitz reacted quickly to Halsey’s suggestions and in turn sent his own communiqué to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The resulting decision, made on September 14, the day before D-Day on Peleliu, was to speed up the landings on Leyte by two months. Points 1 and 2 of Halsey’s recommendations were, however, ignored: a decision that would cost the 1st Marine Division and the 81st Infantry Division over 9,500 casualties.

Nimitz never fully explained his decision to overrule Halsey, saying only that the invasion forces were already at sea, that the commitment had already been made, and that it was too late to call off the invasion. The Palau Islands had excellent airfields from which the Japanese could coordinate air attacks against the Philippine invasion force.

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